OUR NATION'S FORGOTTEN WORKERS: THE
UNPROTECTED VOLUNTEERS
Mitchell H. Rubinstein*
"What an employee is may be unclear, but courts have devised their own
approaches for determining what an employee is not. According to

established case law, partners are not employees and independent
contractors are not employees.
Given those holdings, neither are
volunteers." U.S. District Judge Robert Patterson, Jr.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

We see them everywhere. They work in our nation's hospitals,
schools, police forces, civic and political organizations, social and

community service organizations, eleemosynary and non-profit agencies. 2
They are our nation's volunteers.
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Broadway, 9 th Floor, New York, NY 10004, 212-533-6300, mrubinst@nysutmail.org. The
views expressed in this article are entirely the author's and may not necessarily represent the
views of any organization that he works for or is affiliated with.
1. Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d. 10
(2d Cir. 1990) (noting that a volunteer doctor who received a title, access to a university
library, and helped plan a symposium, but who did not teach or receive wages was not an
employee under Title VII).
2. Volunteers perform a whole host of activities which include, but are not limited to,
fund-raising; collecting, preparing and distributing food; supplying transportation;
mentoring, tutoring, teaching, and providing professional assistance; collecting and
distributing clothing and goods; ushering, greeting or ministering; providing office services;
engaging in music, performance, and other artistic activities; coaching and refereeing sports
teams; counseling; and protecting through services like firefighting and emergency medical
services. Stephanie Boraas White, Volunteering in the United States, 2005, 129 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 65, 70 (2006) (analyzing voluntarism in the United States).

148

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 9:1

The public policy of the United States strongly encourages
voluntarism.' Indeed, voluntarism is critically important to the welfare of
4
this country, particularly in these days of ever-increasing budget cuts.
Much of the country's population participates in volunteering. In each of

3. "Voluntarism is deeply rooted in American culture. In fact, it was the combined
efforts of many unnamed volunteers that marked and shaped the development of the United
States." Diane C. Desautels, Comment, Discrimination Law-Statutory Protection for
Volunteers Against Discrimination: Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., v.
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987), 11
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 93 n.5 (1989). For a historical review of voluntarism in the
United States since colonial times, see Desautels, supra (citing SUSAN J. ELLIS & KATHERINE
H. NOYES, BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF AMERICANS AS VOLUNTEERS (1978)).

In modem times, in 1974, President Nixon signed an executive order establishing
National Volunteer Week as a celebration of volunteering. Since then every U.S. President
has signed a proclamation promoting National Volunteer Week. Additionally, governors,
mayors, and other elected officials often make public statements and sign proclamations
promoting
voluntarism.
National
Volunteer
Week,
http://www.pointsoflight.org/programs/seasons/nvw/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
President Reagan issued an executive order establishing the President's Volunteer
Award, which is presented by the President to recipients in ten categories. Exec. Order No.
12,594, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,703 (Apr. 28, 1987). See also Jean Baldwin Grossman & Kathryn
Furano, Making the Most of Volunteers, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 200 (1999)
(discussing the Points of Light Foundation established by President George H.W. Bush and
addressing President Clinton's encouragement of voluntarism).
In 2005, President George W. Bush issued a proclamation in support of National
Volunteer Week where he called upon "all Americans to recognize and celebrate the
important work that volunteers do every day across this country." Proclamation No. 7885,
70
Fed.
Reg.
20,265
(Apr.
14,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050414-1.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2006). See also Elisabeth Burniller, Bush Urges Graduates to Volunteer in Community,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at 30 (discussing speech by President Bush where he encourages
students and others to embrace the American tradition of volunteerism and community
service).
In recognition of the need to promote voluntarism, many states as well as the federal
government have enacted statutes to limit tort liability of volunteers, particularly with
respect to sporting events. See, Kenneth W. Biedzynski, The Federal Volunteer Protection
Act: Does Congress Want to Play Ball?, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 319, 325-45 (1999)
(analyzing Federal Volunteer Protection Act and similar statutory enactments in the several
states); Rebecca Mowrey & Adam Epstein, The Little Act That Could: The Volunteer
Protection Act of 1997, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 289, 291 (2003) (stating that the
Volunteer Protection Act was designed to extend Charitable Immunity, Sovereign Immunity
and Good Samaritan laws to federal law in order to encourage voluntarism).
4. See, Biedzynski, supra note 3, at 319 (stating that without volunteers many nonprofit and charitable organizations could not function); Leda E. Dunn, Note, "Protection" of
Volunteers Under FederalEmployment Law: Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 451, 452 (1992) (stating that whether volunteers are covered by employment laws
could have "far-reaching effects on both the economy and the viability of charitable
organizations"); Kelley Jordan, Comment, FLSA Restrictions on Volunteerism: The
Institutional and Individual Costs in a Changing Economy, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 304
(1993) (discussing scarcity of resources and the effect budget cuts can have on non-profit
organizations).
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the three years ending September 2005, nearly three out of every ten
Americans volunteered.5
Additionally, more and more students are seeking unpaid internships
after graduating from school. In some industries, an internship has become
a "virtual requirement in the scramble to get a foot in the door.",6 The
opportunity to volunteer can, and often does, provide students and others
with opportunities for growth and training while at the same time providing
individuals with a way to "give something back" to the community.7
However, the volunteer experience may not always work out. This
article addresses what happens when something goes awry. Should a
volunteer who is sexually harassed, for example, be able to sue for sex
discrimination under Title VII? What is a volunteer and where is the line
between "volunteer" and "employee"? Does it matter if the putative
volunteer receives a stipend or just gets his or her expenses reimbursed?
Or, for that matter, is a volunteer simply someone who does not receive any
remuneration? Moreover, who exactly is an employee? These are some of
the questions this article examines. In a very real sense, this article
addresses a clash between the pubic policy which seeks to promote
voluntarism while at the same time promoting the purposes of our nation's
employment laws-such as outlawing employment discrimination.8

5. White, supra note 2, at 65.
That percentage translates to about 65.4 million people volunteering each of these
three years. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, USDL 05-2278, Volunteering
States,
2005
(2005),
available
at
in
the
United
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/volun.pdf (contrasting service demographically).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes detailed statistics on volunteerism. These
statistics establish that women tend to volunteer more than men, whites are the highest racial
group to volunteer, individuals with school-age children are the highest percentage of
volunteers, and volunteerism increases with education. Id.; White, supra note 2, at 65-68.
6. David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 215, 215 (2002) (examining legal and policy implications of student interns in regard
to employment rights).
Large numbers of newly minted college graduates are often willing to work for free to
gain valuable experience. There are also a host of displaced and unemployed white collar
individuals willing to work for free in hopes of obtaining a position with a certain employer.
David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 228 (1998) (discussing the dynamics of and

economic issues involved with student internships and the increasing number of people
willing to work as interns).
7. Voluntarism often provides individuals with increased standing in the community,
an expectation of reciprocal acts of kindness from their recipients, or a form of "'psychic
income' . . . generated by the act of doing good [deeds]." McAdoo v. Diaz, 884 P.2d 1385,
1390 n.5 (Alaska 1994) (citing, Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions:
The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1316-1319 (1986) (discussing
the self-motivations for volunteer work)). Other times, individuals volunteer their time as a
simple act of kindness. Id. (citing, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).

8. Throughout this article, references to employment law are utilized to refer
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Although volunteerism is vitally important to this country, little
scholarly attention has been paid to it, especially in relation to employment
law. 9 This article attempts to fill this gap. I will first explain why it is
important to distinguish between volunteers and employees. I will then
describe the two types of volunteers: the ordinary or pure volunteer and the
"volunteer plus." This article will then discuss the various tests of
employee status and the application of those tests to volunteers. I
ultimately conclude that a two-step test that focuses on whether the putative
employee was hired and whether the putative employer controls the work
in question is the most appropriate test to determine whether volunteers are
employees. Finally, this article also addresses the problem of remedy with
respect to volunteers who may have been discharged in violation of our
nation's employment laws. As the title of this article indicates, volunteers
are our nation's forgotten workers. They are left with virtually no
protection under our labor and employment laws.
II.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN VOLUNTEERS AND
EMPLOYEES?

Determining who is and who is not a volunteer is important for several
reasons. It is obviously important to the purported volunteer since his or
her statutory rights may depend upon whether he or she is classified as an
employee or a volunteer. This is because our employment laws generally
apply to employees only. Similarly, it is important for our nation's
employers to know whether they are subject to the various employment
laws. An employer's exposure to labor and employment legal liability is
largely dependent upon whether volunteers are classified as employees.
It is also important to understand the legal rights of volunteers since
there is potential for abuse. Specifically, some volunteers may be exploited
generically to most of our federal employment statutes since courts often construe them
similarly. This is sometimes referred to as "cross-fertilization." Darren M. Creasy, A Union
of Formalism and Flexibility: Allowing Employers to Set Their Own Liability Under
FederalEmployment DiscriminationLaws, 44 WM & MARY L. REV. 1453, 1453 n.4 (2003).
See also Daniel S. Kleinberger, "Magnificent Circularity" and the Churkendoose: LLC
Members and Federal Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477, 502-503 n. 118
(1997) (noting cross-fertilization and discussing various cases).
However, it should be noted that volunteers at public agencies are treated differently
under the FLSA as a result of detailed regulations which were issued. See infra notes 40-44
and accompanying text.
9. See Gregory H. Perry, Volunteers Enter the Schoolhouse Gate, 79 NEB. L. REV. 998
(2000) (discussing use of volunteers in Nebraska public schools); Desautels, supra note 3
(discussing whether volunteers are protected under Connecticut's Public Accommodation
statute and contrasting that statute with employment laws); Dunn, supra note 4 (surveying
coverage of volunteers under various federal employment laws); Jordan, supra note 4
(discussing voluntarism under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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by employers looking for a source of inexpensive-or worse, free-labor.'°
Given that this nation wants to, and needs to, encourage volunteerism, it
must curb the exploitation of volunteers."
It is also important to properly define what a volunteer is because
there is a need for consistency in the law. Logic would dictate that a
volunteer have the same employment status, or lack thereof, for tax,
unemployment, discrimination, minimum wage, and collective bargaining
purposes. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Employee status is governed
by a host of statutes that may not be consistently interpreted by the courts.12
This can present obvious problems for both employees and employers who
do not know what law governs the relationship between them.
A.

Numerosity Requirements in Employment Law

More fundamentally, whether or not a person or a certain category of
service provider is a volunteer may be important because many of our
employment laws have numerosity requirements and thus will only apply
to employers who have a certain number of employees. As a result, certain
small employers may not meet the minimum statutory threshold if the
putative volunteers are not counted as employees.' 3
10. Professor David L. Gregory notes that many unpaid college interns are desperate to
obtain jobs and that this can lead to exploitation by certain employers. For example,
Gregory states that some employers regard unpaid interns as a means to reduce, if not
eliminate, labor costs while others place interns in meaningless "grunt"-type positions where
they merely fetch coffee and make photocopies, rather than positions that would provide the
intern with valuable experience. Gregory, supra note 6, at 241-43. Of course, as Gregory
also notes, an unpaid internship can provide students with meaningful learning experiences,
future employment, and networking opportunities. Id. As most law school and graduate
school professors know, there is also a potential that law students or other professional
interns can be exploited by volunteering. There is also the potential, however, that
volunteering may open up doors that might otherwise be closed.
11. Of course, volunteers are not the only exemptions from our nation's employment
laws. For example, the NLRA expressly excludes supervisors and independent contractors
from the definition of employee. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000); see Friendly Cab Co., 341
N.L.R.B. 722, 724-25 (2004) (discussing the independent contractor exemption under the
NLRA); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 717-21 (2001) (discussing the
history of the supervisory exemption under the NLRA); VIP Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB,
164 F.3d 644, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that field nurses are not supervisors within the
meaning of the NLRA); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 255-60 (1968)
(discussing the independent contractor exemption under the NLRA).
12. This is not just a law school professor's hypothetical. In 2002, a divided D.C.
Circuit held that a certain individual was an employee under the NLRA even though he was
not paid the minimum wage and did not receive a W-2 tax form. Seattle Opera v. NLRB,
292 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
13. Strictly speaking, statutory numerosity requirements are not jurisdictional, at least
under Title VII. Rather, it is considered to be a threshold requirement, which is an element
of any plaintiffs claim for relief. Therefore, nurmerosity requirements can be waived.
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For example, to spare small businesses from Title VII 4 liability,
Congress defined the term employer as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . .""
".'.Similarly,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 16 only applies to employers
with fifteen or more employees. 7 The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA) 8 applies to employers who have twenty or more
employees.' 9 The overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA) 20 do not apply to employees who work in law enforcement
and fire protection if the public agency employs less than five employees in
those respective activities. 21 Additionally, state workers' compensation
statutes may impose numerosity requirements.2
If volunteers are not counted as employees, certain small employers
may not be subjected to these and other employment laws. Therefore, it is
not surprising that volunteer status has been litigated in connection with
whether an employer employs a sufficient number of employees under
Title VII, 23 ADA, 24 ADEA, 25 FLSA 26, and state Workers' Compensation

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1238 (2006).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)to 2000(e)(17) (2000). Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which makes it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin,
religion, or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
15. Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1239 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)). As
originally enacted, Title VII only applied to employers with twenty-five or more employees.
Congress reduced that number to fifteen employees as a result of the 1972 amendments to
Title VII. Id. at 3 n.2 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000). The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits
discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2000).
17. Id. § 12111(5)(a).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), as amended, prohibits discrimination on account of individuals being at least forty
years of age. Id. § 63 1(a).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).

21. Id. § 213(b)(20).
22. See, e.g., Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, ALA. CODE § 25-5-50(a) (2000)
(stating that employers who employ less than five employees are exempt from the statute);
Ex parte A-O Machine Co., 749 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Ala. 1999) (discussing numerosity
requirements under Alabama law).
23. See e.g., Scott v. City of Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190-91 (W.D. Okla. 2005)
(finding that since volunteer firefighters are not employees, Title VII case is dismissed for
failing to meet numerosity requirements). Accord, Keller v. Niskayuna Consol. Fire Dist. 1,
51 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); Hall v. Del. Council on Crime & Justice, 780 F. Supp.
241 (D. Del. 1992). But see, Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist.,
180 F.3d 468, 473 n.7 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that since volunteer firefighters were
employees, and since the Department had more than 15 volunteer firefighters, it is subject to
Title VII).
24. See e.g., Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist.
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statutes.

27

III. WHO ISA VOLUNTEER?
There are two types of volunteers. The ordinary or pure volunteer is
someone who receives nothing in return from the organization he or she is
serving.28 The other type of volunteer is what I will term a "volunteer
plus." A volunteer plus may have his or her expenses reimbursed and may
receive some types of minor benefits such as death or disability insurance
or even a small stipend. The legal status of the volunteer very much
depends upon the category into which the volunteer falls.
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a person who
performs services "without promise or expectation of compensation, but
29
solely for his [or her] personal purpose or pleasure" is not an employee.
However, in that case, the Court was addressing the issue of whether or not
trainees are employees under the FLSA, it did not examine whether
volunteers are covered under the statute.
The Court expressly addressed the employment status of volunteers
one time in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor.30 In
this 1985 decision, the Court stated that the minimum wage and overtime
32
3
provisions of the FLSA ' would not reach "[o]rdinary volunteerism,
which the Court described as "volunteers who drive the elderly to church,
serve church suppers, or help remodel a church home for the needy."33 In a
footnote, the Court quoted, with approval, a Department of Labor brief that
delineated factors to examine when ordinary volunteerism is involved;
LEXIS 786, at *17 (D. Del. 2005) (holding that volunteer firefighters are not employees,
and the fire company is not covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
25. See e.g., EEOC v. Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming the
decision below that volunteer firefighters are among those not considered employees under
the ADEA and therefore the case is dismissed).
26. See e.g., Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d 522, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that unpaid police officers are volunteers under the FLSA and therefore the case is
dismissed); Genarie v. PRD Mgmt., Inc., Civil No. 04-2082 (JBS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9705, at *41 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding that an unpaid maintenance worker who received an
apartment in exchange for services is an employee under FLSA).
27. See e.g., Kirksey v. Assurance Tire Co., 443 S.E.2d 803, 805 (S.C. 1994) (finding
that a gratuitous worker is not an employee under South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (2002), and therefore the employer did not meet the
numerosity requirement of employing four employees).
28. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303
(describing ordinary voluntarism).
29. Walling, Wage & Hour Adm'r v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
30. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
32. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303.

33. Id. at 302.

154

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 9:1

factors listed include: "the receipt of any benefits from those for whom the
services are performed, whether the activity is a less than full-time
occupation, and whether the services are of the kind typically associated
with volunteer work."3 4 In that same footnote, the Court went on to give
examples of "recognized" volunteer services: "The Department has
recognized as volunteer services those of individuals who help to minister
to the comfort of the sick, elderly, indigent, infirm, or handicapped, and
those who work with retarded or disadvantaged youth."35
Thus, the Court has recognized that ordinary or pure volunteers are
not subject to the FLSA and presumably our nation's other labor and
employment laws. However, not all volunteerism is so pure. In fact after
Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation was decided, the Department of Labor
issued regulations broadening the definition of volunteers at public
agencies that are exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime
requirements.3 6
The easy volunteer cases involve the ordinary or pure volunteer.
When volunteers receive absolutely nothing in return, courts do not seem to
have much difficulty in concluding that they are volunteers under the
various employment statutes. 37 Illustrative of this principle is Mendoza v.
Town of Ross, 38 where a disabled community service officer who worked
regular hours and received an unpaid two-week vacation was held not to be
an employee under California wrongful discharge and California disability
discrimination law because he did not receive any remuneration from the
municipality where he worked.39
After Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation was decided, Congress
amended the FLSA to state that the term employee does not include certain
34. Id. at 303 n.25.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
college graduate research student who received no funds from the putative employer is a
volunteer under Title VII); Pettyjohn v. Principi, Case No. CIV-03-230-C, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30441, at *4 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (noting that plaintiff, a service officer at a hospital,
did not receive any funds from his putative employer, in holding that the plaintiff is a
volunteer under Title VII); Keller v. Niskayuna Consol. Fire Dist. 1, 51 F. Supp. 2d 223,
231-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that firefighters who received no remuneration are
volunteers under Title VII); Benshoff v. City of Virginia Beach, 9 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623
(E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that volunteer rescue squad individuals are volunteers under FLSA
in part because they receive no compensation); Schoenbaum v. Orange County Ctr. for the
Performing Arts, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that individuals
who received no remuneration from a performing arts center are volunteers under the
ADEA).
38. 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
39. Id. at 454. See also Pinchas v. U.S.A. Deaf Sports Fed'n, Inc., No. Civ. 05-4024,
2006 WL 2927651, at *3 (D.S.D. Oct. 12, 2006) (holding that chair of Deaf Olympic Games
organizing committee who received no pay or benefits is not an employee under Title VII).
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volunteers providing services at a public agency who are reimbursed
expenses or paid a nominal fee if such services are not the same type of
services that the individual is employed to perform for that particular public
41
agency. 40 The text of the amended FLSA is set forth in a footnote below.

Additionally, with respect to public agencies, the Department of Labor
issued regulations which further liberalize who a volunteer may be. The
regulations provide that volunteers may be paid reasonable benefits (for
example, tuition, transportation or meal costs, and health insurance or
pension costs under certain scenarios) or a nominal fee, which is not tied to
productivity, for their service without losing their volunteer status.42 The
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(4)(a)(i),(ii). The 1985 Amendments to the FLSA, P.L. 99-150,
99 Stat. 787 (1985), which were effective April 15, 1986, among other things, liberalized
the definition of volunteers who perform services at a public agency. It was not intended to
overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, nor was it
issued in direct response to it. Rather, the regulations were in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1984)
(holding that the FLSA applied to state and local governments). See Todd D. Steenson,
Note, The Public Sector Compensatory Time Exception to the FairLabor Standards Act:
Trying to Compensate for Congress's Lack of Clarity, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1807, 1808-11
(1991) (discussing legislative history of 1985 Amendments to FLSA). The legislative
history concerning this amendment shows that Congress did not intend to discourage or
impede volunteerism undertaken for humanitarian purposes. In fact, Congress simply
intended to prevent abuse and manipulation of volunteers. S. Rep. No. 99-159 (1985), as
reprintedin 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 651 (1985).
41. (4)(A) The term "employee" does not include any individual who volunteers to
perform services for a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate government agency, if(i) the individual receives no compensation or is paid expenses, reasonable
benefits, or a nominal fee to perform the services for which the individual
volunteered; and
(ii) such services are not the same type of services which the individual is
employed to perform for such public agency.

(5) The term "employee" does not include individuals who volunteer their
services solely for humanitarian purposes to private non-profit food banks and
who receive from the food banks groceries.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203 (3)(e)(4)(A)(i)-(ii), (3)(e)(5).
Subdivision 5, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (3)(e)(5), was added as part of the 1998
Amendments to the FLSA. Pub. L. No. 105-221, 112 Stat. 1248 (1998). It applies to nonprofit food banks. It does not appear to be limited to food banks at public agencies.
42. These regulations provide in relevant part:
(a) Volunteers may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits, a nominal fee, or any
combination thereof, for their service without losing their status as volunteers.
(b) A school guard does not become an employee because he or she receives a
uniform allowance, or reimbursement for reasonable cleaning expenses or for
wear and tear on personal clothing . . . Such individuals would not lose their
volunteer status because they are reimbursed for the approximate out-of-pocket
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FLSA regulations however, only apply to public agencies as defined in
those regulations.43
One of the benefits that the regulations expressly allow is health
insurance. Today, as health insurance becomes increasingly expensive,
some employees work simply because of this fringe benefit. However,
under the amended FLSA, a volunteer who performs services for a public
agency may receive substantial benefits, like health insurance, in return for
services and still be classified as a volunteer.
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines volunteers as
"persons who worked without being paid (except for expenses) through or
for an organization at least once during the past year., 44 The BLS
definition is not limited to volunteers who perform services for public
agencies. This type of volunteer45 is an example of what I termed earlier in
this article as a "volunteer plus."
Determining where to draw the line between an employee and a nonto a "volunteer plus" is difficult. In Cleveland v.
employee with respect
City of Elmendorf, 46 non-paid regular auxiliary police officers received a
type of benefit known as a commission, which under Texas law, was
necessary to maintain their licenses to be peace officers. Such a benefit
was not sufficient compensation to transform these volunteers into
However, this was an FLSA case and the court was
employees.

expenses incurred incidental to providing volunteer services, for example,
payment for the costs of meals and transportation expenses.
(c) Individuals do not lose their status as volunteers because they are reimbursed
for tuition, transportation and meal costs involved in their attending classes
intended to teach them to perform efficiently the services they provide or will
provide as volunteers.
(d) Individuals do not lose their volunteer status if they are provided reasonable
benefits by a public agency for whom they perform volunteer services. Benefits
would be considered reasonable, for example, when they involve inclusion of
individual volunteers in group insurance plans (such as liability, health, life,
disability, workers' compensation) or pension plans or "length of service"
awards, commonly or traditionally provided to volunteers ....
(e) Individuals do not lose their volunteer status if they receive a nominal fee
from a public agency. A nominal fee is not a substitute for compensation and
must not be tied to productivity ....
29 C.F.R. § 553.106 (2000).
43. See Hallissey v. America Online, Inc., No. 99-CIV-3785, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis
12964, at *13 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that 1985 FLSA exemption for volunteers only
applies to public agencies, and therefore, a private corporation such as America Online
cannot rely on this exclusion from the definition of employee).
44. White, supra note 2, at 65.
45. A volunteer plus receives some remuneration whether it be expense reimbursement
or a nominal stipend. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
46. 388 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 2004).
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interpreting the liberal regulations applicable to public agencies under the
FLSA.
Similarly, an auxiliary deputy sheriff, who only received
"accoutrements of the trade," such as equipment, training, uniforms, and
reimbursement for expenses incurred while on duty, was not an employee
under the ADEA or Title VII. 47 A search-and-rescue pilot, who was
eligible for death benefits, free military rides, income tax deductions, free
jet simulator time, and free air time and training, was not an employee
under Title VII because such benefits did not constitute compensation.48
On the other hand, a volunteer fire fighter who received a state
mandated pension, life insurance, death benefits, disability insurance, and
some medical benefits was found to be an employee under Title VII,
notwithstanding the fact that he was not outwardly paid any
compensation.49 Similarly, a youth volunteer who received a small stipend,
expense reimbursement, meals, and a uniform, and who was eligible for a
$2500 bonus after one year, was an employee for unemployment insurance
purposes. 5°
While it is the intent of this author to provide assistance in
determining where to draw the line with respect to a "volunteer plus," it is
important to recognize that this is not an easy task because the label placed
on a putative employee/volunteer is not controlling and each case is fact
specific.5'
47. Blankenship v. City of Portsmouth, 372 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (E.D. Va. 2005).
48. Neffv. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 714-15 (S.D. Ohio 1996). See also Hall
v. Delaware Council on Crime & Justice, 780 F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del. 1992) (finding that
a volunteer, who received reimbursement for expenses and free admittance to annual
luncheon, was not an employee under Title VII).
49. Pietras v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999). But see Scott v.
City of Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (finding that a volunteer firefighter
was not an employee under Title VII); Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005) (finding that a volunteer firefighter
was not an employee under the ADA); Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F. 3d 211, 22122 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a factual question exists whether volunteer firefighter was
an employee in that firefighters were entitled to state funded disability pension, scholarships
for dependents upon disability or death, group life insurance, tuition reimbursement for
courses on medical and fire service techniques, travel expenses, special commemorative
license plate and access to a method of obtaining certification as a paramedic).
50. Kelley v. City Volunteer Corps, 563 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), appeal
granted,573 N.Y.S.2d 466 (N.Y. 1991), appeal withdrawn, 575 N.Y.2d 459 (N.Y. 1991).
51. See Vojvodich v. City of Elmendorf, Texas, 388 F. 3d 522, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)
(looking to "the totality of the circumstances" to determine employee status under the
FLSA); EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F. 3d 696, n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating
that an employer cannot escape Title VII by labeling employee a partner); Hallissey v.
America Online, No. 99-CIV-3785, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12964, at *13-40 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (conducting a factual investigation into the plaintiffs' expectations of compensation,
the significance of their role at America Online, and the benefits to the parties in ruling that
the plaintiffs were volunteers); Rodriguez v. Township of Holiday Lakes, 866 F. Supp.
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IV. WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE?

It has long been recognized that work is important to us. It provides
us with the means to provide for our families. Additionally, in some cases
it defines who we are and what we are interested in.52 According to
William Blackstone, work is one of the three great relations in private life. 3
Unfortunately, two and a half centuries later, there is no clear
understanding of how the law should distinguish between employees and
non-employees. Therefore, it is not surprising that courts have to struggle
with determining when a "volunteer plus" is, in reality, an employee.
This is due, at least in part, to the fact that many modem work

1012, 1020 (S.D. Texas 1994) ("Courts routinely look beyond the labels employers use and
apply the [fact specific] "economic reality test" in FLSA cases to determine the employment
status of an individual."); Schoenbaum v. The Orange County Center For the Performing
Arts, 677 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (C.D. Ca. 1987) (conducting a factual investigation into the
activites of the plaintiffs as directors and trustees of defendant organization to determine
that they were not employees under the ADEA). See also Kelley, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 171
(stating that fact that parties signed a letter of understanding which indicated that an
individual is a volunteer is not binding on the court).
52. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisisof Work in ConstitutionalPerspective, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 523, 533 (1997) (arguing that we often become like our jobs and the work
we do affects how others think of us). See also MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORKLAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 5-6 (2005) ("The significance of work in the lives of most
Americans resonates with themes of Protestantism, particularly self-sufficiency and
industriousness. While some past civilizations viewed work as a 'degrading pursuit to be
carried out by those at the bottom of their cultural hierarchy,' modem Western culture sees
hard work and diligence as positive virtues, marks of good character."); David L. Gregory,
Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformationof Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 119, 130
(1988) (stating that work "helps us become more fully human").
53. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *410 ("The three great relations in private
life are, 1. That of master and servant; which is founded in convenience, whereby a man is
directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own skill and labour will not be
sufficient to answer the cares incumbent upon him. 2. That of husbandand wife ...[and] 3.
That of parent and child ....)
Sigmund Freud also recognized the importance of work to society. When asked to
name the most important things in life, Freud's answer was "Love and work." MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (5th ed.
2003).
It should be noted that the nature of work is changing. Long term job security
between a worker and an employer is becoming a thing of the past. Today, many
individuals expect to change jobs, and employers often overhaul their work force as
production and skill demands change. As Professor Stone has stated: "Indeed, the very
concept of the workplace as a place, and the concept of employment as involving an
employer, are becoming out-dated." Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protectionsfor Atypical
Employees: Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without
Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2006) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-894930 (referring to increased use of temporary workers, homeworkers, and independent contractors).
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relationships are ambiguous and highly fact specific.54 Additionally, there
is not one uniform test to determine who is an employee.55 Unfortunately,
the statutory language utilized in most employment statutes is utterly
useless. For example, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) defines an
employee in the following manner: "the term employee shall include any
employee ...

,56

The FLSA defines employee as "any individual

employed by an employer."5 7 The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) of 1974,58 the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of
1993,' 9 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 60 ADEA, 61 and ADA 62 all
define employees in the same manner. Additionally, various state statutes
concerning workers compensation, wage and hour laws, and antiOne scholarly64
discrimination statutes utilize similar definitions.6 3
commentator has described these statutory definitions as "baffling.,
Numerous courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that these

54. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 883. Even where it is clear which test of employee
status should be utilized, courts have found that it is not easy to apply the definitions
contained in those tests to specific facts. E.g., Matter of O'Brien v. Spitzer, 851 N.E.2d
1195 (N.Y. 2006).
55. Most cases concerning whether or not someone is an employee concern claims that
the employee is an independent contractor and therefore, not subject to the employment law
at issue.
56. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). Note that the FLSA further defines the verb "employ"
expansively to mean "suffer or permit work." Id. § 203(g). The other employment statutes
discussed herein do not contain any similar language. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1991) (noting that the FLSA's definition of "employ" results in
its definition of "employee" being more expansive than under ERISA).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2006).
59. Id. § 2611(3).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006).
61. Id. § 630(f).
62. Id. § 12111(4) (2000).
63. See Richard R. Carlson, Why The Law Still Can't Tell An Employee When It Sees
One And How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 296 n.5 (2001)
(citing a sampling of state laws defining "employee").
Some courts have noted the similarity in language and consequently have held that
analysis under the various employment statutes should be interchangeable. See, e.g.,
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 219 n.2 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Although we were
construing the definitions of 'employee' and 'employer' under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ('ADEA'), the operative language in ADEA is identical to the operative
language in Title VII, so the analysis utilized under either act is interchangeable"). Accord
Garrett v. Phillip Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981, n.4 (4th Cir. 1983).
64. Carlson, supra note 63, at 296. See also MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 465 (6th ed. 2003) (comparing and
contrasting the various tests for employee status under Title VII, the ADEA and the FLSA);
Craig J. Ortner, Note, Adapting Title VII To Modern Employment Realities: The Case For
The Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2614 (1998) (describing Title VII
jurisprudence as "murky" with regard to the definition of an employee).
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definitions are circular and useless.6 5
The Supreme Court, having long wrestled with defining "employee,"
has recognized that there is not one "simple, uniform and easily applicable
test which . . . determine[s] whether persons doing work for others" are

employees under the statute in question.66 The Supreme Court explains that
"[flew problems in the law have given greater variety of application and
conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is
clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of
independent, entrepreneurial dealing. 67
From a public policy perspective, this lack of clarity is somewhat
shocking.
The consequences to an employer for misclassifying an
employee can be enormous. If an employee has been mischaracterized as
an independent contractor, for example, the employer may owe its
employees large sums of monies because employees are generally entitled
to fringe benefits, which can be substantial.68

65. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003)
(stating that definition of employee under ADA is a "'mere nominal definition' and
"'completely circular'); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)
(stating that definition of employee under ERISA is "completely circular and explains
nothing"); U. S. v. City of New York, 359 F. 3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (In analyzing whether
workfare participants are employees under Title VII, court states that Title VII's definition
of employee is circular); Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th
Cir. 2003) ("In both Title VII and the ADA, Congress adopted a circular definition of
'employee'...."); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that
definition of employee is circular in analyzing whether work study students are employees
under Title VII); Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 786, at *9 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005) (stating that definition of employee under ADA is
circular and of "limited utility"); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F.Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), aff d., 898 F. 2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990)(stating that Congress defined "employee" in Title
VII with "magnificant circularity").
However, this non-definition of the term "employee" has also been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as being very broad. See, e.g., NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516
U.S. 85, 87 (1995) (finding that "salts," paid union organizers who obtain a position with an
employer to help organize a union, qualify as employees under the NLRA); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985) (stating that the definition of
employee under the FLSA "is exceedingly broad"); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
891 (1984) (holding that the definition of employee under NLRA covers undocumented
aliens).
66. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944) (holding that independent
contractors were not excluded from the definition of the term employee under the NLRA).
However, in 1947, Hearst was legislatively overruled by the Taft-Hartley Amendments to
the NLRA. See generally NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968)
(discussing legislative history of the 1947 amendment to the definition of employee under
the NLRA).
67. HearstPubl'ns, 322 U.S. at 121.
68. Stone, supra note 53 (citing Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.
1997)).
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Courts have developed four different tests to determine whether an
individual is an employee: the common law agency test, the primary
purpose test, the economic reality test, and a test which combines the
common law standard with the economic reality test known as the hybrid
test.69
A.

Common Law Agency Testfor Employee Status

The starting point for determining employee status is the common law
standard, which has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 220.70 The Supreme Court has described the common law test as follows:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry
are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether. the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision
71
of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
The Court went on to state that , "[s]ince the common- law test contains no
short hand formula or magic phrases that can be applied to find the answer,
...all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed
with no one factor being decisive."7 2
The Supreme Court applied this common law test in Community for

69. One appellate court has arguably recognized another test for employment status
known as the "entrepreneurial opportunity" test where the court examines whether or not the
putative employee has an opportunity for significant gain or loss. Corporate Express
Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Cf SAMUEL ESTREICHER &
MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 20 (2004) (questioning
whether entrepreneurial opportunity is an additional test to determine employee status).
In any event, this test seems to applicable to the issue whether a putative employee is
a independent contractor. It does not seem to have any application to volunteers. This test,
which is also not widely followed by other courts, is probably an off shoot the common law
agency test applicable in NLRB proceedings.
70. Gregory, supra note 6, at 233.
71. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (quoting Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-752 (1989)) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).
72. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. Ins. Co. of America,
390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
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Creative Non-Violence v. Reid73 to determine whether an artist was an
employee for purposes of the Copyright Act of 1976. 74 In so doing, the
Court also recognized that employees are not limited to individuals who
receive a formal salary.75
The Court also applied this test to determine whether an insurance
broker was an employee under ERISA,76 rejecting the claim that the statute
was to be construed "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end
to be attained., 77 Thus, the Court rejected the "primary purpose test"7 8 as
the appropriate test to determine employee status under ERISA.79
The common law test has also been applied in employment cases by
some courts with respect to cases arising under the ADA,8 ° Title VII,"' and
ERISA.82

Many courts that apply the common law standard do so because
Congress did not provide any useful definition of the term employee in the

various employment laws. Those courts reason that Congress, therefore,
intended that the traditional common law standards be applied.8 3 However,

a serious problem with the common law standard is that it results in courts
73. 490 U.S. at 751-52.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.(2006). See id. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment is part of work made
for hire. Id. § 101. Therefore, the copyright belongs with the employer. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737. Hence, it was important for the Court to determine whether
or not the artist in Reid was an employee.
75. Cmty.for CreativeNon-Violence, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8.
76. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323.
77. Id. at 324 (citing Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701 (4th Cir.
1986)).
78. For a discussion of the primary purpose test, see infra notes 85-93 and
accompanying text.
79. Indeed, the Court notes that after the Supreme Court opinions in both NLRB v.
Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1947) (adopting the primary purpose test under the NLRA)
and U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1944) (adopting the primary purpose test under the Social
Security Act), Congress amended those statutes, demonstrating that common law principles
were the key to determining the statute's definition of employee. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
503 U.S. at 326.
80. E.g., Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2003); Dykes
v. DePuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1998); Burt v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., No. CV 042929-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2711495 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2006); Parker v. Yuba County
Water Dist., No. 02:06-cv-0340-GEB-KJM, 2006 WL 2644899 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006);
Wojewski v. Rapid City Regional Hospital, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated in
part, 450 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 2006).
81. E.g., Alberty-Velez v. Corporaci6n De Puerto Rico para la Difusi6n P6blica, 361
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111 (2d
Cir. 2000); Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., No. 99-CV-0048E, 2006 WL 625839
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2006).

82. E.g., Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir. 1996).
83. Broyhill Furniture, 2006 WL 2711495; Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee
Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 84 (1984).
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concentrating on the formal structure of the employment, rather than on the
reality of the relationship.84
B.

PrimaryPurpose Test

The Supreme Court has applied the primary purpose test several times.
In Hearst, the Court rejected the common law standard because it resulted
in inconsistent rulings and because there was a need for uniformity in labor
law since it was national legislation.85 Instead, the Court adopted what
became known as the "primary purpose test":
Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term
"employee" includes such workers as these newsboys must be
answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the
legislation. The word "is not treated by Congress as a word of art
having a definite meaning. . . ." Rather "it takes color from its
surroundings ... [in] the statute where it appears," and derives
meaning from the context of that statute, which "must be read in
light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained. 86
However, in applying this primary purpose test, the Court also
indicated that, in doubtful situations, courts could examine "underlying
economic facts" and the underlying "economic relationship" to help
determine whether or not someone was an employee.8 7 Thus, the Court
recognized early in its labor law jurisprudence that economic relationships
were important to determining whether or not someone was an employee,
laying the ground work for what later became the "economic realities"
test.8 8 Indeed, three years later, in a case concerning the definition of
employee for Social Security tax purposes, the Court, while purporting to

84. Id.
85. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944).
86. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 129.
88. It was not until 1968 in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968)
that the Court would again grapple with the distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor under the NLRA.
As a result of the 1947 amendments to the Act, which expressly excluded independent
contractors, the Court abandoned its earlier decision in Hearst. The Court held that in
determining employee status under the NLRA, the proper standard to be applied was the
common law agency test. United Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 390 U.S. at 256.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the NLRB, like courts, see infra notes 106-117
and accompanying text, has sometimes utilized a blended approach of the common law and
the economic reality tests to determine employee status. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy
Christian McCormick, The Myth Of The Student-Athlete: The College Athlete As Employee,
81 WASH. L. REv. 71, 92 (2006) (noting that the NLRB's common law test for determining
who is an employee has included elements of the economic reality test). For the NLRB's
recent treatment of this issue, see St. Joseph News-Press, 345 NLRB No. 31 (2005).
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follow primary purpose test from Hearst, concluded that the workers in

question were employees because
such workers were employees "as a
89
matter of economic reality. ,

It appears that the NLRB applied a variant of the primary purpose test
in Brown University.9
In Brown, the Board held that graduate students
were not employees 9 ' under the NLRA because the relationship between
the university and student was "primarily an educational one, rather than an
economic one." 92 Brown, however, purported to apply the common law

89. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
In Silk, the Supreme Court adopted the same criteria and the Hearst analysis to determine
whether or not a worker was an employee for Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.,
purposes. As it did with respect to the Hearst decision, Congress later responded by
amending the Social Security Act to state that common law standards apply in determining
employee status. Dowd, supra note 83, at 92.
90. 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
91. Courts have issued conflicting opinions regarding the employment status of
graduate students in non-NLRB cases. For example, students have been held as nonemployees for prevailing wage purposes under New York law. In re Onondaga-CortlandMadison Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. McGowan, 728 N.Y.S.2d 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
One court has even summarily held that graduate students are not employees under Title
VII. Pollack v. Rice Univ., No. H-79-1539, 1982 WL 296 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Additionally,
a court has held that resident assistants are not employees under the FLSA. Marshall v.
Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981). On the other hand, graduate assistants
have been held to be employees under Title VII. Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d
1230 (1lth Cir. 2004); Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 863 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ohio 1994). See
also EEOC Decision No. 88-1, at *7 (1988) (holding medical interns are employees under
Title VII); Bagley v. Hoopes, No. 81-1126-Z, 1985 WL 17643, at *4 (D. Mass. 1985)
(stating students receiving work study are employees under Title VII). The Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue and has only recognized that trainees whose labor provides no
immediate advantage to the employer are not employees under FLSA. Walling v. Portland
Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947). An analysis of the status of graduate students and
related student workers is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Gregory, supra
note 6 (discussing status of volunteer student interns and the potential for abuse); Sheldon
D. Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions, and Brown University, 20 LAB.
LAW. 243, 253-55 (2004) (discussing the NLRB decision in Brown University which held
graduate students were not employees under the NLRA); Yamada, supra note 6 (examining
legal and policy implications of student internships with particular emphasis on
employment); Robert A. Epstein, Note, Breaking Down The Ivory Tower Sweatshops:
GraduateStudent Assistants and Their Elusive Search For Employee Status on the Private
University Campus, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157 (2005) (discussing whether
graduate students are employees under the NLRA or Title VII); Ortner, supra note 64
(discussing employment status of unpaid interns under Title VII).
92. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004). Our nation's universities are relying
upon graduate student labor "more than ever before as a cost-effective way to operate
institutions of higher learning." Epstein, supra note 91, at 158 (footnote omitted). The
issue of whether or not graduate assistants, or similar types of student workers, are
employees has generated a significant amount of controversy and litigation. The NLRB has
flip flopped on this issue several times; first holding that they are not employees, Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974), then holding that they are, N.Y. Univ., 332
N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000), and then returning to its original holding that they are not employees
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standard.9 3
C. Economic Reality Test
The economic reality test developed because of the narrow focus of
the common law test on the standard of control. This test examines the
balance of power in the putative employment relationship.9 4
In 1947, the Court arguably first adopted the economic reality test in a
Social Security tax case when it recognized that while control was
characteristically associated with employment, with respect to social
legislation, courts need to examine employees "who as a matter of
economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
of circumstances
service." 95 The Court further indicated that the totality
96
must be considered when determining employee status.
The Supreme Court adopted the economic realities test in Tony and
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,97 which is the only
under the NLRA because they are primarily students, Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483
(2004). See also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 88, at 93-96 (reviewing historical
treatment of students by the NLRB).
The presidential appointed and highly political NLRB is well known to overrule its
own decisions when its composition shifts due to a change in Presidential administration.
See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Pleafor Rulemaking, 37
ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 167 (1985) (stating that when Congress created the NLRB, it "sought
in an agency whose membership would change periodically with new administrations in the
White House a measure of built-in flexibility"). Indeed, at the 58th NYU Annual
Conference on Labor, the keynote speaker, NLRB Chairman Robert J. Battista, candidly
stated that the "Board majority will generally reflect ... the views of the President" and that
"fluctuations are part of the deliberative process built into the Act." Robert Battista,
Chairman, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., The NLRB At 70: Its Past and Its Future (May 20,
2005), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/r2559.pdf. See also JULIUS G.
GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 10 (2d ed. 1999) (stating
that NLRB decisions are often based upon political considerations); James J. Brudney,
Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221,
223 (2005) (stating that the NLRB operates in "an openly partisan manner"); Mitchell H.
Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct Discovered After an Employees'
Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 7 n.28
(1990) (discussing political nature of NLRB). For an interesting twist to the graduate
student/employee debate, see McMormick & McMormick, supra note 88, which argues that
student athletes at universities are employees under the NLRA even after Brown Univ.
93. See Brown Univ. 342 N.L.R.B. at 483, 490 n.27 (considering the common law
standard as a factor in determining that graduate assistants are not employees).
94. See Dowd, supra note 83, at 102 (noting decisions that expanded the definition of
employee to embrace previously ignored protected groups); see also Stone, supra note 53
(stating the common law test of employee status is narrower than the economic realities
test).
95. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
96. Id. at 130 ("It is the total situation that controls").
See also supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text
97. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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Supreme Court case that addressed whether a volunteer, instead of an
independent contractor, is an employee.
The employer, a non-profit religious foundation that ministered to the
sick and needy, derived its income from commercial businesses. It staffed
these businesses with former drug addicts, derelicts, and criminals before
their rehabilitation by the foundation. These associates did not receive any
cash payments, but instead relied on the foundation for food, clothing,
shelter, and other benefits. Interestingly, the workers did not seek
protection under the Act and actually protested their coverage. 98
The Court held that the workers' protestations, even if sincere, were
not dispositive. As the Court explained:
The test of employment under the Act is one of "economic
reality," see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366
U.S., at 33, and the situation here is a far cry from that in
Portland Terminal. Whereas in Portland Terminal, the training
course lasted a little over a week, in this case the associates were
"entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in
some cases several years." 567 F. Supp. at 562. Under the
circumstances, the District Court's finding that the associates
must have expected to receive in-kind benefits-and expected
them in exchange for their services--is certainly not clearly
erroneous. Under PortlandTerminal, a compensation agreement
may be "implied" as well as "express," 330 U.S., at 152, and the
fact that the compensation was received primarily in the form of
benefits rather than cash is in this context immaterial. These
benefits are, as the District Court stated, wages in another form. 99

The Court rejected the argument that coverage of these associates would
lead to coverage of other volunteers under the FLSA and stated that
"[o]rdinary volunteerism is not threatened by this interpretation of the
statute."' 0 '
In Cuddeback v. FloridaBoard of Education,'0 1 the court applied the
(discussing Tony and Susan Alamo Found.)
98. Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 300-301.
The U.S. Secretary of Labor filed the action, alleging violations of the minimum
wage, overtime, and record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 206(b), 207(a), 21 1(c), 215(a)(2), 215(a)(5). Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 471
U.S. at 293.
99. Tony andSusan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301.
100. Id. at 303.
101. 381 F.3d 1230 (1lth Cir. 2004). But see Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc., 592
N.W.2d 360 (Mich. 1999) (applying the economic reality test to a volunteer member of the
National Ski Patrol System who received free lift tickets, skiing privileges for family
members, free hot beverages, and reduced price merchandise to conclude that the individual
was not an employee under Michigan Workers Compensation law because no hiring took
place).
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economic realities test to determine that a graduate student who worked in
a professor's laboratory was an employee under Title VII. However, the
court also indicated that this issue should be resolved in light of the
common law principles of agency, so it is questionable whether the court
was applying the economic reality test or a hybrid test involving both the
common law standard and the economic reality test. Applying this
standard, the court held that the plaintiff was an employee because she
received a stipend, benefits, and the terms of her employment were
governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Further, the court noted
that the school declined to reappoint her because of performance10 problems,
2
relating to time and attendance, as opposed to academic reasons.
Additionally, in Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen,"3 the Seventh Circuit
applied the economic reality test to determine whether migrant workers
the relevant
were independent contractors under the FLSA. In describing
10 4
factors, the court included the degree of employer control.
As one can see, the economic reality test as interpreted by some
courts, has started to look like the common law test set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, thus bluffing the vision in a field
of law that is already operating in a fog. Because the economic realities
test has not been uniformly applied, some courts have expressly adopted a
combination test that emphasizes key policy concerns. They have cleverly

102. Cuddeback, 381 F.3d at 1234-35.
103. 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987).
104. The Seventh Circuit summarized the factors courts should examine in making this

determination:
In seeking to determine the economic reality of the nature of the working
relationship, courts do not look to a particular isolated factor but to all the

circumstances of the work activity. Certain criteria have been developed to
assist in determining the true nature of the relationship, but no criterion is by
itself, or by its absence, dispositive or controlling.

Among the criteria courts have considered are the following six:
1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control as to the manner in
which the work is to be performed;
2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his
managerial skill;

3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his
task, or his employment of workers;
4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship;
6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged

employer's business.
Id. at 1534-35.
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coined it the hybrid test.'l 5
D.

Hybrid Test

The hybrid test combines elements of both the common law test
reflected in the Restatement of Agency and the economic reality test. 0 6
Indeed, a majority of the circuit courts appear to have adopted the hybrid
test. 107 In a sense, they are seeking the best of both worlds. Several
circuits, however, have noted that there is "little discernible difference

105. See Darren M. Creasy, Note, A Union Of Formalism and Flexibility: Allowing
Employers to Set Their Own Liability under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1453, 1464-71 (2003) (describing the different types of hybrid tests
used by the courts).
106. See Id. at 1464 (stating that a hybrid test used by the courts "combine[s] elements of
the straightforward economic realities test and the common law agency test" ). See, also,
Zinn v. McKune, 143 F.3d 1353, 1357 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying hybrid test in determining
whether a state whistleblower is an employee under Title VII); Lambertsen v. Utah Dep't. of
Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the hybrid test to determine whether a
teaching assistant employed by the department of corrections is an employee for Title VII
purposes); Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 68 F.3d 480, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 16
1995) (unpublished disposition) (adjudicating a Title VII retaliation claim for sex
discrimination by a casino entertainer by applying the hybrid test); Wilde v. County of
Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994) (advocating a hybrid test in ADEA and Title
VII contexts); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (remanding an ADEA
claim to determine whether a shoe salesman was an employee under the hybrid test); Deal v.
State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas, 5 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the
hybrid test under the ADEA and Title VII, to determine whether an insurance salesperson is
an employee); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (utilizing a hybrid
test under Title VII); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (outlining
several standards and applying a hybrid test to resolve an ADEA claim made by a sales
agent); Knighten v. State Fair of La., No. 03-1930, 2006 WL 725678, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar.
21, 2006) (adjudicating a dispute under Louisiana's Whistleblower statutes by applying
hybrid test to a non-profit employer); Cornish v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, No. 3:04CV-0579R, 2006 WL 509416, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2006) (adjudicating a racial
discrimination claim under Title VII and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act by
applyinig the hybrid test); Scott v. City of Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (W.D. Okla.
2005) (using the hybrid test to determine whether an officer is an employee of the state for
gender discrimination purposes); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(utilizing a hybrid test under the Civil Service Act and Title VII).
107. Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
"nearly every appellate court has applied a test described as a hybrid of the common-law
test and the economic realities test"); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 n.2 (collecting
and analyzing conflicting case law applying the hybrid test); Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg'l
Hosp., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated in part, 450 F.3d 338 (8th
Cir. 2006) (noting that the Eight Circuit has adopted hybrid standard). See also Jeff
Clement, Note, Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia: An Out Of Tune Definition of
"Employee" Keeps FreelanceMusiciansfrom Being Covered by Title VII, 3 DEPAUL Bus.
& COM. L.J. 489, 495 (2005) (stating that "[t]he test most often applied for Title VII
purposes is the hybrid test").
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between the hybrid test and the common law agency test." 0 8
One illustrative case, EEOC v. Zippo Manufacturing Co.,'0 9
determined that district managers are independent contractors under the
ADEA.
The court found it significant that the employer exercised
virtually no control over the putative employee other than keeping track of
sales records and that the individuals in question had the ability to establish
their own business by hiring their own employees and servicing their own
customers in certain sales locations."0 In another case, Deal v. State Farm
County Mutual Insurance Co. of Texas,' the court determined that agents
were independent contractors because the company did not supervise them
or pay them directly.
On the other hand a factual question was found to exist under Title VII
12
with respect to whether a mime at a hotel and casino was an employee.
Though the mime was hired to perform an act she developed, the mime
provided her own costume and was not trained by the hotel or supervised
by the hotel, the hotel assigned the putative employee extra assignments,
she had little discretion in terms of when and how long to work, the
putative employee could not change her performance and was paid by the
week as opposed to by the job." 3
Thus, we are left with four different tests for employee status though,
in reality, they may not be so different.' 14 The lack of uniformity is not
surprising given the circular definitions in the employment statutes
themselves. Additionally, it is important to recognize that the common law
definition of employee reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
108. Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993). Accord Lambertsen v. Utah
Dep't of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028; Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc. 68 F.3d 480 at
*3 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished disposition); Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103,
106 (8th Cir. 1994).
109. 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 38.
111. 5F.3d117(5thCir. 1993).
112. Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 68 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
disposition).
113. Id. at *1-*2.
114. It should be noted that several academic commentators have argued that there is

little difference between the various employment status tests. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby &
David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities ": The Case For Amending Federal
Employment DiscriminationLaws to Include Independent Contractors,38 B.C. L. REv. 239,

254 (1996); Clement, supra note 107, at 509; Valerie L. Jacobson, Note, Bringing A Title
VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing To Sue Is The Most Applicable?, 18 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 95, 108 (1990). Several circuits have come to the same conclusion as these
commentators. E.g., Lambersten v. Utah Dept. of Corrs., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.
1996); Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994); Frankel v. Bally,
Inc. 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Burt v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., No. CV 042929-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2711495, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2006) (stating economic
reality test is not materially different from common law test).

170

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 9:1

which all the other tests spring from, was not designed as a test for
employment law purposes. Rather, it was originally developed under tort
law principles to determine whether an employer had vicarious liability for
the torts committed by those who might be advancing the firm's
interests. 5I
The lack of uniformity is not a new or an unrecognized employment
law problem. In 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton appointed a
blue-ribbon commission, chaired by former Labor Secretary and Harvard
professor John Dunlop, to examine the labor markets and to make
recommendations to Congress.1 6
One of the Commission's
recommendations was the adoption of a single definition of "employee"
that would apply to all labor and employment statutes." 7 Unfortunately,
Congress has not acted. Therefore, it is no wonder that courts have
struggled with how a "volunteer" should be defined. Courts can not even
get straight who an employee is.
115. See Michael C. Harper, Defining The Economic Relationship Appropriate For
Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REv. 329, 334 (1998) (discussing the common law
development of the definition of an employee); Dowd, supra note 83, at 80 (analyzing the
history of the common law standard). See also NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. I11,
120 n.19 (1944) (stating that the common law right to control test evolved from tort
concepts in order to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor for purposes of
vicarious liability).
116. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 69, at 21.

117. As the Dunlop Commission Final Report explained:
[E]ach major labor and employment statute--has its own definition of employee
and its own way of drawing the line between employees and independent
contractors. Many of these definitions appear to be quite similar. But they were
created over a period of a half century, and their language is often vague or
circular, leaving them open to a broad range of interpretations. As a result, the
line has been drawn differently in the different statutes, depending on the
inclinations of the agency at the time or Supreme Court doing the drawing.
These differences in interpretation mean that a worker might be deemed an
employee for purposes of the FLSA but an independent contractor for purposes
of the NLRA, without any apparent policy justification for the disparity of
treatment. The Commission finds no principled justification for this regulatory
morass ....

The law in this area should be modernized and streamlined: there

is no need for every federal employment and labor statute to have its own
definition of employee. We recommend that Congress adopt a single, coherent
concept of employee and apply it across the board in employment and labor
law. ... The determination of whether a worker is an employee protected by
federal labor and employment law should not be based on the degree of
immediate control the employer exercises over the worker, but rather on the
underlying economic realities of the relationship. .

.

.

Workers who are

economically dependent on the entity for whom they perform services generally
should be treated as employees.
U.S. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS-FINAL REPORT 64-66

(1994), availableat http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/key-workplace/2.
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APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT TESTS TO VOLUNTEERS

Just as courts are divided with respect to the applicable test to
determine whether or not an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor, courts are also divided with respect to the applicable test to
distinguish between employees and volunteers. Courts have primarily
issued conflicting opinions when addressing whether a "volunteer plus," as
opposed to an ordinary volunteer, is an employee or not." 8
Thus, in order to determine whether the purported volunteers are
employees under employment discrimination statutes, courts have applied
the primary purpose test, 1 9 the economic reality test, 2 ° and the hybrid
test. 121 Other courts have focused exclusively on whether the individual in
question received any remuneration and examined what constitutes
remuneration. 22 Additionally, others have adopted a two-step approach
requiring that the putative
employer control the work and that the purported
23
volunteer be hired.
Similarly, in examining whether a volunteer is an employee under the
FLSA, some courts have applied the economic reality test, 24 while others
118. See supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text (describing distinction between an
"ordinary volunteer" and a "volunteer plus").
119. Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
120. Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
786, at *11 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005); Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 712 (S.D.
Ohio 1996).
121. Scott v. City of Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (W.D. Okla. 2005).
122. See, e.g., Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that
compensation is essential in an employee/employer relationship); Pietras v. Bd. of Fire
Cormm'rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999) (focusing analysis
on whether the employee received a salary); Pettyjohn v. Principi, No. Civ-03-230-C, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30441, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 17, 2005) (opining that an employment
relationship requires that one obtain financial benefit); Blankenship v. City of Portsmouth,
372 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (E.D. Va. 2005) (focusing analysis on whether monetary benefits
received by the volunteer constituted wages); Hall v. Del. Council of Crime & Justice, 780
F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del. 1992) (holding that the remuneration received was insufficient to
determine whether the volunteers were employees); Schoenbaum v. Orange County Ctr. for
the Performing Arts, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (C.D. Ca. 1987) (discussing importance
of compensation in determining whether unpaid Board members constitute employees).
123. See, e.g., Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211,220 (4th Cir.
1993) (using the two-prong test); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997)
(listing the factors taken into consideration under the two-factor approach). See infra notes
135-161 and accompanying text (discussing the two-part test).
124. See, e.g., Genarie v. PRD Mgmt. Inc., No. 04-2082, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9705, at
*33 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2006) (holding that plaintiff is an employee under the economic reality
test); Todaro v. Twp. of Union, 27 F. Supp. 2d 517, 534 (D.N.J. 1998) (relying on an
economic reality test to determine an individual's employment status); Krause v. Cherry
Hill Fire Dist. 13, 969 F. Supp. 270, 274 (D.N.J. 1997) (utilizing the economic reality test
because it "provides the traditional framework for determining when a worker is an
employee within the meaning of the FLSA"); Rodriguez v. Twp. of Holiday Lakes, 866 F.
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have not expressly adopted any one particular test. Instead, they apply a
totality of circumstances test, which applies the statute in question in a
common sense manner by analyzing the facts of the particular case at

hand. 125
Most cases that have utilized one of the employment status tests
attempted to define the line between an employee and a volunteer by
utilizing a test developed to distinguish between an employee and an
independent contractor. 12 6 However, the employment status of volunteers
has very little to do with the issue of whether or not someone is an
independent contractor. For example, simply because a volunteer in a
hospital gift shop is directly under the control of an administrator, because
the administrator sets the hours, may say nothing with respect to whether or
not he is an employee if he or she receives absolutely nothing in return.
Yet, under most tests mentioned above that element of control would be an
important factor in determining his status.
In Clackamas GastroenterologyAssociates v. Wells, 27 the Supreme

Court recognized that the tests for determining whether or not someone was
an independent contractor or an employee were not very helpful in
determining whether physician shareholders were employees under the

Supp. 1012, 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (applying the economic reality test for FLSA purposes).
125. See, e.g., Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988) (opining
that courts should look at factors beyond those included within the economic reality test);
Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying a test that looked at
factors beyond the economic reality test).
For example, in Hallissey v. America Online, Inc., 99-Civ-3785, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12964 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2006), the court held that a factual issue was present
whether or not "community leaders" who serviced interet message boards and chat rooms,
but received free internet access, a compact disc case, expanded web space, anti-virus
software, and employee discounts, were employees under the FLSA. In making this
determination, the court held that it was free to decide which factors were relevant. The
court concluded that the following factors were relevant: 1. whether plaintiffs had an
expectation of compensation; 2. whether plaintiffs were integral to AOL; 3. whether AOL
received any benefits; and 4. whether the employee received any benefits. Id. at *12-*39.
The court described as "crucial" to this inquiry the question of whether or not plaintiffs had
any express or implied expectation of compensation. Id. at * 16.
On the other hand, in Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf Texas, 388 F.3d 522 (5th Cir.
2004), the court did not expressly outline the factors it needed to examine, instead simply
stating that the totality of the circumstances should be applied in a common sense manner.
However, the court appeared to concentrate on such factors as whether a commission, which
is a type of benefit necessary to become a paid peace officer, given to unpaid police officers
was a sufficient type of benefit to establish that the individuals in question were employees.
The court concluded that the unpaid police officers were not employees since that benefit
was not sufficiently tangible. Id. at 527-529.
126. See notes 69-117 and accompanying text (discussing four different tests utilized by
courts to determine whether an individual is an employee).
127. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
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Americans with Disabilities Act. 28 In that case, the Court held that the
issue to be decided amounted to whether or not the shareholders managed
the business as proprietors rather than employees.1 29 However, the Court
did say that the common law element of control was "the principal
guidepost that should be followed."' 13
Clackamas is a watershed case with respect to volunteers, due to the
fact that the Supreme Court recognized that while traditional tests to
determine employee status may be helpful, they were not binding because
the court was not distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors. Numerous lower courts have reached the same conclusion
with respect to volunteers.'
Additionally, a number of courts have recognized that the application
of any employment status test in a rigid fashion does not make much sense
that the test of
in employment law. Thus, these courts have recognized
32
employee status may change in certain situations.
128. Id. at 447-48
129. Id. at 442.
130. Id. at 448. The Court held that the following six factors should be considered in
determining employment status:
[1.]Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and
regulations of the individual's work
[2.]Whether and, if so, to what extent the organizations supervises the
individual's work
[3.]Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization
[4.]Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization
[5.]Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as
expressed in written agreements or contracts
[6.]Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the
organization.
Id. at 449-450 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009 (2000)).
131. Todaro v. Twp. of Union, 27 F. Supp. 2d 517, 534 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding that using
tests to determine whether or not someone is an independent contractor is of limited use in
determining whether or not someone is a volunteer under the FLSA). Accord Krause v.
Cherry Hill Fire Dist. 13, 969 F. Supp. 270, 276 (D.N.J. 1997). See also Haavistola v.
Cmty. Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1993) (indicating that the right of control is critical
in independent contractor cases, but not dispositive in volunteer cases); Smith v. Berks
Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that using a test to
determine whether an individual is an independent contractor under Title VII is not very
helpful in determining whether a volunteer is an employee).
132. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to apply
common-law agency test to determine employment status before finding the existence of a
"hire"); Graves v. Women's Prof'l Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining
the use of the economic realities test or the right to control test because the court found no
approximation of an employment relationship between the parties); Hallissey v. America
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While utilizing a case-by-case approach makes sense on some level, it
leaves the employment status of volunteers in limbo. There is a great risk
of inconsistency. It is submitted that regardless of which standard is
adopted, with one exception, a single across-the-board standard needs to
materialize. 33 The one exception concerns the FLSA's treatment of
of Labor
volunteers working at public agencies, since the U.S. Department
34
promulgated a specific regulation regarding volunteers.
A.

The Two-Step Employment Status Test

In O'Connor v. Davis,'35 the Second Circuit had to grapple with many
of the same issues that courts have had to deal with in regard to volunteers.
The plaintiff was doing her school-required fieldwork at the Rockland
Psychiatric Center and was paid through her college's work-study program.
She sought to bring a sexual harassment complaint against Rockland
Psychiatric Center, but there was a problem as to her employment status.
Rockland Psychiatric Center did not pay her, the college did. Her college
also awarded her academic credit for her field work.
Plaintiffs Title VII complaint against Rockland Psychiatric Center
was only viable if she was an employee. In analyzing this issue, the court
found the common law agency test, which was applicable to Title VII
claims, to be of little utility "because it ignores the antecedent question of
whether O'Connor was hired by Rockland for any purpose. . . . [O]nly
where a 'hire' has occurred should the common-law agency analysis be
undertaken."' 36
The court then went on to analyze when a "hire" would occur. The
court explained this as follows:
[T]he common feature shared by both the employee and the
independent contractor is that they are "hired part[ies]," and thus,
a prerequisite to considering whether an individual is one or the
other under common-law agency principles is that the individual
have been hired in the first instance. . . . [C]ourts turn to
Online, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12964, at *16-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he employeremployee relationship does not lend itself to rigid per se definitions."); Tadros v. Coleman,
717 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ajfd 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990) (combining
various tests to determine employment status).
133. The need to reform American employment law to establish a single uniform test for
employee status was one of the recommendations of the Dunlop Commission in 1993. See
supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. Although the Dunlop Commission did not
address the status of volunteers, the same policy reasons which justify a single test of
employee status would be applicable to volunteers.
134. See supra note 40-43 and accompanying text. This article makes no attempt to
formulate the appropriate test for volunteers with regard to public agencies under the FLSA.
135. 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997).
136. Id. at 115.
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common-law principles to analyze the character of an economic
relationship "only in situations that plausibly approximate an
employment relationship."
Where no financial benefit is
obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no
"plausible" employment relationship of any sort can be said to
exist because . . . "compensation by the putative employer to the
putative employee in exchange for his services ... is an essential

condition to the
relationship."' 3 7

existence

of

an

employer-employee

In a later Second Circuit decision, the court, relying on O'Connor,
summarized this two-part test as follows:
First, the plaintiff must show she was hired by the putative
employer. To prove that she was hired, she must establish that
she received remuneration in some form for her work. This
remuneration need not be a salary, but must consist of
"substantial benefits not merely incidental to the activity
performed[.]" Once plaintiff furnishes proof that her putative
employer remunerated her for services she performed, we look to
....the federal common law of agency.'3 8
Thus, the Second Circuit requires that two conditions be satisfied for
an individual to be considered an employee. First, the putative employee
must be hired, which requires that he or she receive some form of
economic remuneration. Second, the employer must control the work
under the Second Restatement Agency standard. This is the analysis
developing regarding the appropriate test to distinguish between volunteers
and employees under the NLRA as well as under other employment laws.
Several cases involving the issue of volunteer employment status have
applied elements of this two-step analysis. An auxiliary deputy sheriff was
found to be a volunteer under the ADEA and Title VII because he received
no monetary benefits other than the accoutrements of his trade, such as
equipment and training.139 Because the volunteer in question received no
compensation, the court did not have to address the applicability of the
employer's right of control. Another court adopted the same type of
137. Id. at 115-116 (citations omitted).
138.

United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied,

543 U.S. 1146 (2005) (citations omitted).
139. Blankenship v. City of Portsmouth, 372 F. Supp. 2d 496 (E.D. Va. 2005). See also
Pettyjohn v. Principi, No. CIV-03-230-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30441 (W.D. Okla. 2005)
(holding that hospital volunteers were not employees under Title VII); Keller v. Niskayuna
Consol. Fire Dist. 1, 51 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that firefighters who
received no pay or benefits were not employees under Title VII); Schoenbaum v. Orange
County Ctr. for the Performing Arts, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
volunteers were not employees under the ADEA); Mendoza v. Town of Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr.
3d 452, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding volunteers are not employees under California
wrongful discharge law).
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analysis and held that a volunteer firefighter was not an employee under the
ADA because any remuneration he received was de minimis. 14 °
Several other courts have adopted this analysis in determining
employee status outside the typical scenario of deciding whether someone
is an independent contractor. One court held that a male rodeo contestant
was not an employee of a non-profit rodeo association, which sponsored
events open only to female rodeo contestants. The male plaintiff was not
an employee under Title VII since he was not paid and compensation "is an
essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship." 14' The court also stated that it will only examine the right to
control test or the economic reality test after there is a plausible
employment relationship. 42 Similarly, a medical student could not state an
ADA claim against a medical school because
he did not receive any
43
remuneration for the work that he performed. 1
Also, a doctor who was appointed to Cornell Medical Center as a
visiting lecturer was not considered an employee under Title VII where he
performed no services for Cornell and did not receive any salary or benefits
other than use of the medical library. To be an employee, the putative
employer must both pay the individual and control his work.' 1 The court
rejected the argument that the significance of Cornell's appearance on
plaintiffs resume was the "type of salary or other 'benefit' contemplated
by Title VII.', 145 Plaintiff was simply a volunteer.
Another court held that an attorney who performed services for a bar
association was not an employee under Title VII, even though the attorney
was provided with clerical support and networking opportunities incidental
to the services he performed. 146 The court expanded on O'Connorand held
that the benefits in question must rise to a minimum level of significance
and these activities were not sufficiently substantial to meet this standard.
Additionally, the NLRB decided several cases involving volunteers
that are critically important. Jurisprudence developed under the NLRA is
particularly important in employment law because it is likely to be
140. Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
786 (D. Del. 2005).
141. Graves v. Women's Prof'I Rodeo Ass'n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990).
142. Id. at 74.
143. McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998).. See
also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
144. Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd 898 F.2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1990).
145. Id. at 1005 n.14. While the court indicated that the plaintiff had use of Cornell's
medical library in its description of the facts, this fact is not analyzed in the opinion.
Presumably, library privileges alone are also not a sufficient economic benefit required
under Title VII, at least where the doctor in question does not perform any services or
receive any pay.
146. York v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002).
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persuasive in other courts with respect to other areas of employment.
Indeed, as I have previously written:
The National Labor Relations Act is the grandparent of most
labor laws. As such, courts dealing with other areas of labor law,
particularly employment discrimination, often look to NLRB
decisions for guidance. Given the paucity of case law ... astute
parties may
cite to NLRB case law when litigating .
-in other
47
forums. 1

The NLRB first addressed the issue of volunteers in 1999. In WBAI
Pacifica Foundation,41 the NLRB had to decide if unpaid volunteers
working at a radio station should be included in a bargaining unit with
other employees. The Board held that such volunteers should not be
included because they were not employees. The unpaid staff produced a
majority of the radio programs and only one of them obtained travel49
reimbursement, though it appears others were eligible for this benefit.
Unpaid staff was also allowed to file grievances as they were covered
under the existing collective bargaining agreement.
In deciding whether the individuals in question were employees, the
Board looked to NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,"O which broadly
interpreted the NLRA to include paid union organizers within the definition
of employee. In that case, the Supreme Court examined the dictionary
definition of employee as including "any 'person who works for another in
return for financial or other compensation."""' The Board also cited with
approval Black's Law Dictionary's definition of an employer as an
organization that has the right to control the putative employee's work. 5 '
147. Rubinstein, supra note 92, at 12-13. See also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Advisory
Labor Arbitration Under New York Law: Does It Have a Place in Employment Law?, 79
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 419, 437 (2005)("[I]n employment law, courts have often looked to
decisions interpreting the older National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") for guidance ...
.'1).

148. 328 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1999).

149. Id. Under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, unpaid staff were also
eligible for a childcare allowance. The Board did not view this as material since none of the
individuals in question ever attempted to utilize this benefit.
150. 516 U.S. 85(1995).
151. Id. at 90 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 604 (3d ed. 1992)).
152. The Board quoted the Town & Country decision as follows:
The ordinary dictionary definition of "employee" includes any "person who
works for another in return for financial or other compensation." American

Heritage Dictionary 604 (3d Ed. 1992). See also Black's Law Dictionary 525
(6th ed. 1990) (an employee is a "person in the service of another under any
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the
power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how
the work is to be performed").
WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1274 (1999) (quoting Town & Country, 516
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Additionally, the Board indicated that it is appropriate to look at the
policies and practices of the statute to determine employee status. '53
Ultimately, the Board interpreted the Act to require "at least a rudimentary
economic relationship . . . between employee and employer" and because
1 54
this was lacking, the unpaid staff were not considered employees.
Although the test has some similarity to the primary purpose test and the
economic realities test, the Board is essentially
adopting the same two-step
55
approach as O'Connordid two years earlier.
Auxiliary choristers who performed services for the Seattle Opera
were found to be employees by the NLRB and the D.C. Circuit. 56 They
were each paid a flat fee of $214.00 for their services, which consisted of
seven to nine rehearsals and six to eight performances. That flat fee was
once designated as an "honorarium," but was later changed to indicate that
it reflected transportation reimbursement.
Again, without citing to
O'Connor,the Court interpreted WBAI Pacifica Foundation as establishing
a two-step analysis to determine whether or not someone was a volunteer.
A person has statutory employee status if "(1) he works for a statutory
employer in return for financial or other compensation and (2) the statutory
employer has the power or right to control and direct the person in the
material details of how such work is to be performed."' 5 7 The Board and
the D.C. Circuit majority did not view the $214 dollars as expense
reimbursement, although it was labeled as such. The choristers were
entitled to this fee even if they did not incur any expenses, and they were
not required to submit any forms documenting these expenses. There was
no dispute to the second prong of the test that the employer had the right to
control the work in question.
The dissent viewed the majority's decision as "arbitrary and
ridiculous."' 58
It viewed the $214 flat fee as trivial and only a
reimbursement for expenses given the amount of work that was performed.
The dissent was also troubled by the fact that if the individuals were
employees, the employer would be in violation of the FLSA minimum

U.S. at 90).
153. WBAI, 328 N.L.R.B. at 1275 ("At the heart... is the principle that employee status
must be determined against the background of the policies and purposes of the Act.").
154. Id. at 1274.
155. Interestingly, the Board did not cite O'Connor.
156. Seattle Opera Ass'n, 331 N.L.R.B. 1072 (2000), affd, 292 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
157. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
While the first prong of O'Connor focused on whether a hiring took place, this test is very
similar in that O'Connor also examined the issue of remuneration in order to determine
whether a hiring took place. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text (discussing
case law approving use of a two prong test).
158. Id. at 773 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
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wage provisions and the tax code since the employer did not provide a W-2
wage reporting form. Significantly, however, the dissent did not seem to
disagree with the utilization of the two-part test.
The disagreement was
1 59
test.
that
of
application
the
to
respect
only with
The two-step approach of the NLRB seems to be the most practical
test for distinguishing between volunteers and employees. The test has also
been utilized in other areas of employment law. 60 As recognized by the
NLRB, elements of this test have also been used by the Supreme Court.'6
This test takes into account the fact that in the least there must be a hiring,
as well as the fact that the putative employer must control the work of the
individual in question. While the application of this test, like the
application of any test, might be difficult to apply in certain factual
situations, the law is developed enough in employment law that the twostep approach should be adopted by the courts as the uniform standard.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY
Since a pure volunteer does not receive any remuneration and a
"volunteer plus" receives nominal compensation at best, the issue of
remedy needs to be examined. At first blush, one might believe that such
individuals, even if they were victims of unlawful discrimination or other
types of unlawful employment practices, would not be able to obtain any
remedial relief since they suffered no monetary damages due to their lack
of receiving general wages.
However, injunctive relief might be available to volunteers in order to
seek an end of the discriminatory practice in question. 62 The volunteer
159. See also Children's Miracle Network, No. 31-CA-25115, 2001 WL 1782903, at *4
(N.L.R.B.G.C. Dec. 12, 2001) (stating that celebrity hosts on television shows are not
employees since they only received reimbursement for expenses and that any good will

associated with the event was too speculative to constitute a form of compensation).
Note that NLRB General Counsel Opinions are not decisions of the NLRB. The
NLRB may or may not agree with such opinions. See, e.g., 2 Guide to Employment Law
and Regulations § 17:225 (2006) (noting disagreement between NLRB and General Counsel
of the NLRB with regard to a certain legal issue); Tuv Team Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 756 (Sept.
30, 2003) (noting that the NLRB General Counsel opinions are not always agreed upon by
the NLRB).
The NLRB General Counsel is separately appointed by the President of the United

States and exercises general supervision over all NRLB attorneys other than administrative
law judges and legal assistants. The General Counsel also acts as a prosecutor by bringing
complaints before the NLRB, and has final authority, on behalf of the NLRB, in
investigating charges and issuing complaints pursuant to statute. However, the NLRB
adjudicates these complaints. 51A C.J.S. LaborRelations § 609 (2006).
160. O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997). See supra notes 135-139 and
accompanying text (discussing O'Connor and later cases).
161. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
162. See Thomas v. Washington County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990)
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63
could also seek reinstatement to the position he or she previously held. 1
There is even authority which holds that plaintiffs can recover
punitive damages even where the plaintiff did not establish that he or she
was entitled to compensatory damages.'64 The circuits, however, are split
with respect to this issue.165 In an egregious case, it would not seem like
such a great leap for a court in a circuit that does not require compensatory
damages to award punitive damages to a volunteer.
The Supreme Court has held that an undocumented alien who is the
victim of an unfair labor practice is not entitled to back pay. 66 However,
because the employer violated the law, the employer could be required: to
cease and desist from committing unfair labor practices; to post a notice
setting forth the rights of employees; and to outline the unfair labor practice
which has been committed. 167 Therefore, the fact that a volunteer or a
"volunteer plus" may not be entitled to any compensatory damages does
not mean that individual is not entitled to some form of relief from the
courts.

(discussing how a job applicant, who failed to establish that he was entitled to reinstatement
under Title VII, was entitled to injunctive relief, which mandated that the employer adopt a
non-discriminatory hiring process); EEOC v. Harris Farms, Inc., No. 02-6199, 2005 WL
3039204 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (stating that, generally, victims of employment
discrimination are entitled to injunctive relief, which is specifically designed to prevent
future discrimination); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (indicating that while an uncompensated volunteer would not be entitled to back pay
under Title VII, he or she may be entitled to injunctive relief).
163. See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 n.9 (1975) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1970 ed., Supp. III) (listing several remedies, including
reinstatement, available under Title VII).
164. Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998)
("[U]nder federal law, when a jury finds a constitutional violation under a § 1983 claim, it
may award punitive damages even when it does not award compensatory damages.")
(quoting Erwin v. Manitowoc County, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Pac.
Int'l Equities, Inc., No. 98-1458, 2000 WL 989987 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2000) (awarding
punitive damages of ten thousand dollars in addition to nominal damages of one dollar to
plaintiff); c.f Wright v. Bryan Mfg. Co., No. S85-751, 1989 WL 250931 (N.D. Ind. 1989)
(showing that an award of nominal damages does not preclude an award of punitive
damages).
165. Compare Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010 (permitting the award of punitive damages in the
absence of an award of compensatory damages), with Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that punitive damages must be reasonably related
to the compensatory damages awarded).
I will leave it to others to further examine the intricacies involved with the circuit
split. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 64, at 959 (collecting authorities). See
generally Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Actual Damages to
Support Award of Punitive Damages-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R. 4th 11 (1985) (compiling
decisions concerning the sufficiency of showing of actual damages to support punitive
damages).
166. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
167. Id. at 152.
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Additionally, where an employee has committed misconduct that
would have justified his termination had the employer known about it at the
time of his termination, he may be awarded back pay up until the date the
employer discovered the misconduct, but not reinstatement. 16 It would
seem that the opposite should be true with respect to volunteers. A
volunteer should be eligible for reinstatement even though he would not be
entitled to an award of back pay. Perhaps under Title VII the injured
volunteer may also be entitled to emotional distress damages. 169
The injured volunteer would almost certainly be entitled to attorneys
fees under Title VII, as a plaintiff only needs to establish nominal damages
in order to recover attorney fees. Even without nominal damages, a
plaintiff can be considered a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees if he
or she establishes entitlement to injunctive relief or reinstatement. 170
Since a volunteer's remedy is somewhat limited, some might question
why a volunteer or a "volunteer plus" would choose to litigate. An
individual's voluntary service is important. To the extent that a volunteer
take his or her volunteerism seriously, he or she may view the services
performed no differently than those of a paid employee. In fact, if the
individual feels aggrieved, he or she may be more offended than an
employee who is at least getting paid. Thus, the volunteer, if he or she can
afford it, may be more likely to litigate in order to make a statement against
the organization through the lawsuit.
VII. CONCLUSION

This country needs volunteers for several critically important reasons.
They provide free labor, which is critical to certain non-profit organizations
that need more workers than they can afford to pay. 17' Additionally,
volunteerism provides students and other individuals,2 some of whom may
17
be disabled, the opportunity to establish themselves.
There does not seem to be any dispute that our nation's employment

168. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
169. See, e.g., Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussing emotional distress damages under Title VII).
170. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757-58 (1980) (stating that Congress permits

awarding counsel fees if a party has prevailed on at least some of his claims). Accord Texas
State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-93 (1989). See also
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.35, at 267-69 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing

coverage of attorney's fees and costs as judical remedies). See generally Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103 (1992) (discussing eligibility for award of attorney fees).
171. Jordan, supra note 4, at 303.
172. Unfortunately, there are statistics indicating that employers tend to shy away from
hiring individuals with disabilities. There is some debate about whether or not this is the
result of employment discrimination against disabled workers. Id. at 306.

182

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 9:1

laws do not cover the pure or ordinary volunteer. 173 However, conflicting
opinions have been issued with respect to a certain type of individual
whom I termed a "volunteer plus." Usually, when volunteers receive
something extra, such as a stipend or benefits, they are more likely to be
found to be employees-but this is not always the case. Their employment
status depends upon the type of benefits they receive and which type of test
the court will utilize to determine employee status.
In the ideal world, it would be preferable not to have different
standards to determine whether someone is an employee. However, it is
Congress' responsibility to change this if it desires one uniform standard.
While it is submitted that a single uniform standard would further public
policy by providing more certainty, it is significant that Congress has not
acted to amend our employment laws to provide one clear definition of
who an employee is.
However, it would not be all that unusual for
Congress to act to define the line between a volunteer and an employee,
since there are other federal and state employment statutes which
specifically include volunteers within its protection."'
Unless Congress acts, there is likely to be great variation in this
country with respect to which employment test should be applied in

173. Of course, where an individual receives a substantial benefit in exchange for
services, courts have not had much trouble finding that such an individual is an employee
notwithstanding the fact that the individual did not receive any wages. See, e.g., Genarie v.
PRD Mgmt., Inc., No. 04-2082, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9705, at *41 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2006)
(stating that a maintenance worker who receives a free apartment is considered an employee
under FLSA).
174. See United States Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(B)
(2006) (including within the definition of employee certain individuals who render service
without pay or for nominal pay); Florida Workers' Compensation Law, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
440.02(15)(d)(6)(West 2006) (including volunteers who work for state, county, city, or
other governmental entities within the definition of employee under Workers'
Compensation Law); Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Law, 77 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1031a(2) (2005)(defining employee to include all members of volunteer ambulance corps);
Utah Workers' Compensation Law, UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-20-3(2)(a)(West 2006)
(requiring supervising agencies to provide workers' compensation for volunteer safety
officers); McClung-Gagne v. Harbour City Volunteer Ambulance Squad, 721 So. 2d 799,
800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that a volunteer paramedic who injured his back
while lifting a stretcher was entitled to workers compensation under Florida law); Borough
of Heidelberg v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 894 A.2d 861, 866 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)
(stating that a volunteer emergency medical technician who performed services for
ambulance corps and had not earned wages for 32 years is entitled to workers compensation
under Pennsylvania law). But see Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mgmt., Inc., 592 N.W.2d 360, 366
(Mich. 1999) (stating that a volunteer member of the National Ski Patrol who received free
lift tickets, skiing privileges for his family, hot beverages, and reduced meals and
merchandise was not an employee under Michigan Workers Compensation statute since he
was not hired for pay); Walrond v. County of Somerset, 888 A.2d 491, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006) (stating that volunteers are not covered under New Jersey Workers'
Compensation statute).
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determining whether or not someone is an independent contractor or an
employee. However, it is submitted that the appropriate test to determine
whether a volunteer is an employee must both examine whether the
putative employee was hired which involves an examination of whether the
employee receives remuneration and whether his or her work is controlled
by the employer.
Volunteers often share a likeness to employees in that they may report
to work every day and may even work side by side with employees. There
does not appear to be any reason why those volunteers should not be
covered under the law-particularly if they satisfy the two-part test
discussed throughout this article.
Finally, it is important to remember that simply because an individual
is a volunteer, it does not necessarily follow that he or she does not have
any recourse to challenge his or her termination from volunteer service.
For example, discharged volunteers have brought claims under state
defamation law,' 75 the whistleblower statutes, 176 the First Amendment, 77 as
well as statutes which outlaw discrimination in places of public
accommodation. 78 One can even envision a volunteer bringing a common
law tort action, such as assault or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, against the company that the individual volunteers for.'79 Of
course, it is also possible that a volunteer may use a tort claim directly
against an individual employee. 8 ° Therefore, it is important for courts and
175. McAdoo v. Diaz, 884 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Alaska 1994) (finding that a discharged
church volunteer states claim for defamation under Alaska law based upon termination
letter, but does not have cause of action under state whistleblower statute since plaintiff was
not an employee).
176. See id.
177. See, e.g., Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that an
alleged loss of a valuable governmental benefit as retaliation was a valid First Amendment
claim). But see New York State Law Officers Union v. Andreucci, 433 F.3d 320, 327 n.5
(2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the Second Circuit has not yet decided how claims of
termination from volunteer positions should be analyzed under the First Amendment).
178. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination in any place of public accommodation); Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy
Ass'n., 427 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing plaintiff's claim of discrimination
under Title III of the ADA governing public accommodations). But see Quinnipiac Council,
Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352,
360 (Conn. 1987) (finding that the Connecticut public accommodation statute does not
apply to services of volunteers).
In addition to the ADA, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6
(2006), and 39 states, including the District of Columbia, outlaw discrimination in places of
public accommodation. Desautels, supra note 3, at 96 n.23 (listing statutes of jurisdictions
that have enacted public accommodation statutes).
179. See, e.g., Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005)
((upholding plaintiffs negligent retention and supervision tort claims) overruled in part on
othergrounds by Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 464 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2006)
180. See Hanford v. Plaza Packaging Corp., 778 N.Y.S. 2d 768, 768 (N.Y. 2004)
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litigants to think outside the box of employment law-which this article has
addressed-to determine whether there are any non-employment causes of
action. 1"

(finding that an employee may bring an action against employer and co-worker asserting
intentional infliction of emotional distress and other claims).
181. I will leave it to others to explore in further detail non-employment causes of action
applicable to volunteers.

